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Technical Efficiency and Economic Incentives
More U.S. workers die each year on the job than were killed in 
the U.S. military cumulatively from 1998 through November 2004, 
even after including self-inflicted and accidental military deaths (DIOR 
2005). In 2001, there were 8,786 job-related fatal injuries (5,900 not 
counting the fatalities caused by the terrorist attacks of September 11), 
or about 3.7 fatal injuries per 100,000 workers. Workers made 2.1 mil-
lion trips to the emergency room for injuries sustained from accidents 
at work (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2004). Workers’ 
compensation insurance, which covers all medical expenses and part 
of lost wages associated with injuries, cost employers $63.9 billion in 
2001 (Williams, Reno, and Burton 2003). The indirect costs of acci-
dents—lost wages, damage to equipment, and training and rehabilita-
tion expenses—were several times this amount.
Human resource management (HRM) is usually viewed as an aux-
iliary function in a firm, contributing nothing to that firm’s output—a 
cost tolerated because payroll, benefits, and certain types of human re-
source activity must be organized before the real job of production can 
be undertaken. But HRM practices can affect accident costs in three 
ways. Two of the three pertain to the real or intrinsic risk in the work-
place. “Real” risk is the level of physical danger of accidental injury 
or occupational disease that comes from workers producing output. As 
men interact with machines, both men and machines cause accidents. 
Accidents can be reduced by modifying either part of the interaction: 1) 
by increasing workers’ incentives to be careful, or 2) by modifying the 
workplace environment to employ processes, procedures, equipment, 
and ergonomics that reduce on-the-job injuries. In addition, HRM pol-
icy can reduce accident costs by lessening workers’ incentives to file 
false or inflated accident claims for any given level of real risk.
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Most models of firm behavior ignore HRM, assuming management 
simply chooses labor and capital to maximize firms’ profits. As the 
product price, the wage rate, or the rental cost of machinery changes, 
so do the optimal production of widgets and the optimal configuration 
of inputs. In these traditional models, labor is passive with respect to 
the production process in two ways: labor does nothing to improve the 
technical efficiency of the firm, and labor always acts in the firm’s best 
interest, regardless of labor’s own incentives. Management is assumed 
to know everything the workers know.
THE IMBALANCE CREATED BY ASYMMETRIC 
INFORMATION
But the traditional model is seriously flawed, as there is ample evi-
dence that workers are not passive. What workers know about their 
own behavior or about the firm’s technology may profoundly affect 
profitability. Costs may also rise because of excessive consumption 
of fringe benefits by employees when legitimate claims are difficult to 
distinguish from questionable claims. Or management may ignorantly 
be providing inferior plant design or unsafe production processes—re-
source misallocation that could be improved with labor’s help. Such 
asymmetric information, where employees know something that it is 
difficult or costly for management to know, can yield costs that are un-
necessarily high.
The collapse of the Enron Corporation is an example of how impor-
tant asymmetric information can be, though the information asymmetry 
there was largely between management and shareholders. Enron man-
agers and accountants deceived shareholders into believing the com-
pany was in much better financial shape than it actually was, having 
information about company debt and revenue that the general public 
did not have. This asymmetry of information was exploited by manage-
ment, inflating company stock value beyond its actual worth in order to 
increase management income and maintain management control.
 While asymmetric information problems between management 
and shareholders, such as happened at Enron, are a spectacular type 
of asymmetric information problem, such problems also exist between 
management and company employees. In most jobs it is impractical to 
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monitor all employee behavior. So employees know more about their 
work effort and level of care than managers do. Where such asymmetric 
information exists, questions arise: Are employees working as hard as 
they have agreed to work under the employment contract? Are the em-
ployees treating company property with the same respect and due care 
with which they would treat their own property, so that there is no thiev-
ery, vandalism, or misuse of company equipment? Are the employees 
being as safe as prudently possible? Are the employees only using sick 
days when they need to use them? Are the employees only filing lost-
work insurance claims for legitimate, on-the-job injuries? These are all 
areas where asymmetric information can drive a wedge between what 
management expects and what employees deliver.
HRM Practices Can Treat Asymmetric Information Problems
HRM practices are increasingly viewed as one way the firm can ad-
dress asymmetric information problems. The hypothesized causal link 
between HRM practices and a reduction in asymmetric information 
problems has HRM changing profits: HRM programs provide work-
ers with incentives to change their behavior by aligning their activities 
with management’s profit objective. Without these incentives, profits 
are lower.
This model cannot be tested in its entirety; too many model compo-
nents remain either unmeasured or unmeasurable. For example, asym-
metric information is not public information; it is not measured. Profits 
and even costs are not uniformly reported for all companies, especially 
for small and medium-sized companies such as we have in our sample. 
However, there is one important category of cost—safety costs—which 
is measured in sufficient detail to use in testing our model. The test is 
simple: do alternative HRM practices affect employees’ injury claims? 
Do some HRM practices help reduce injury-claim frequency? Do other 
HRM practices help reduce injury-claim severity? If they do reduce 
safety costs, is it because the HRM practices are improving technical 
efficiency or because HRM practices are reducing disability benefits 
consumption associated with asymmetric information?
In this book, we estimate how various HRM practices affect occu-
pational safety: which HRM practices lower firms’ workers’ compensa-
tion costs and whether their impact comes through changes in technical 
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efficiency or through induced changes in workers’ behavior. We present 
a model of safety outcomes in this chapter that illuminates the ways in 
which HRM might affect safety outcomes, and in the next chapter we 
use this model as a basis for reviewing the empirical research in this 
field. We present our own research findings in Chapters 3 and 4. In 
Chapter 5 we draw conclusions.
THE ACCIDENTS-OUTPUT TRADEOFF
Either improved technical efficiency or labor incentives will lower 
firms’ overall safety costs, including outlays for machinery, compen-
sating differentials for risk, and lost work time. Frequently we ignore 
the overall influence of safety. One long-recognized shortcoming of the 
simple classical model is that it fails to take into account that the firm 
produces not only output but accident claims with a given level of labor 
and capital inputs. That is to say, in real-world industrial processes, ac-
cidents are a natural by-product of production. Getting rid of all job ac-
cidents is often feasible only with very large reductions in output. Even 
white-collar workers occasionally bump their heads in their cubicles or 
get paper cuts that may become infected; wearing special headgear and 
thick mittens could prevent such accidents. We rarely wear headgear 
or mittens in the office because the reduction in productivity would 
outweigh any gains in safety. On the other hand, sometimes we can 
increase the level of output by ignoring prudent safety precautions—
such as by taking off the safety guards from machinery or removing the 
guardrails along catwalks and stairs that inhibit the movement of mate-
rials—but accident costs resulting from ignoring basic safety practices 
generally outweigh the additional output that would be garnered by do-
ing so. There is a tradeoff between accidents and output.1 
Another shortcoming of the classical model, mentioned earlier, is 
that the human factors in the production process are not passive—em-
ployees may react to incentives, and employees may provide valuable 
information about the optimal organization of production. For example, 
when construction workers show management how a wall can be framed 
more safely and quickly by assembling it horizontally on the ground, 
rather than piecing it together vertically in the air, they provide valuable 
information on the technical efficiency of the process. Because workers 
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are assembling products every day and building techniques are con-
stantly changing, opportunities for uncovering such technical efficien-
cies are abundant. When HRM practices lead to improved techniques of 
production, technical efficiency improves. Accident prevention costs, 
broadly defined, fall. 
HRM Practices Can Also Treat Safety Behavior Problems
Likewise, variations in HRM practices may change worker safety 
behavior and the firm’s safety costs. Consider the time path of injury 
benefits, shown in Figure 1.1, typical of workers’ compensation laws 
in most states—including Minnesota, from which we draw our sample 
for this study.     
  
The first three days following the injury are known as the waiting 
period in workers’ compensation. (It is three days in Minnesota; other 
common waiting periods are five and seven days.) During the waiting 
period, the injured worker receives no lost wage benefits, though all of 
the injury-related medical costs are covered by the firm’s workers’ com-
pensation insurance policy. Hence, during the waiting period there are 
only payments for medical treatments. After the waiting period, two-
thirds of the worker’s lost wages are replaced by indemnity payments 
(payments for lost wages, in addition to the medical payments). Both 
the waiting period and the partial wage replacement are types of insur-
ance cost sharing. Insurance contracts are structured so that whenever a 
worker is injured, he bears part of the wage-loss risk.
Figure 1.1  Time Path of Injury Benefits
Medical-only 
payments
Two-thirds of lost wages replaced 
by workers’ compensation insurance
Date of injury Waiting period   Time since injury
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THE PERILS OF MORAL HAZARD
Cost sharing, such as waiting periods and partial wage replacement, 
mitigates incentive problems under asymmetric information. Behavior-
al changes resulting from incentives generated by disability and health 
insurance coverage are known as moral hazard. In other words, moral 
hazard exists when workers (or firms or health care providers) change 
behavior for personal gain under an insurance contract. 
There are many actions an insured worker or health care provider 
can take that affect the size or the probability of a loss.2 With respect to 
injuries that are temporarily disabling, for example, an insurance con-
tract may specify that the only disabilities covered are those arising 
from injuries sustained while on the job. Hence, a worker may claim a 
given condition arose from a job injury and may seek temporary total 
disability benefits because his real health condition does not qualify un-
der the contract. Or, the worker may have a recurring health condition, 
such as lower back pain, which in the absence of insurance he simply 
tolerates, since treatment would impose personal costs. When insured, 
however, he may choose not to work and incur health service costs and 
draw disability benefits since others are paying the benefits. An extreme 
case of behavioral change might be overt fraud in which a worker—fac-
ing a pending layoff—claims injury benefits when no injury or health 
condition was incurred, either on or off the job.
Insurance contracts recognize that moral hazard is costly. If insurers 
or firms had full information about all workplace injuries, they could 
reimburse workers for all lost wages until those workers returned to 
work. Under full information, the firm would know what injuries were 
work-related and the firm would know exactly when the worker was 
able to return to work. But firms don’t usually have such information. 
Monitoring the behavior of all participants in an insurance contract is 
costly, and the costs of such monitoring generally exceed the benefits. 
The workers know this, and since they have considerable latitude in 
changing their behavior to enhance their short-run well-being, they 
sometimes behave differently than they would in the absence of insur-
ance payments. Therefore, the root of the moral hazard problem is an 
information asymmetry between workers and firms—workers know 
more about their own health status, as well as their preference for lei-
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sure over work (hence their willingness to feign injury if it results in 
paid leisure time), than firms know. 
Workers’ compensation insurance recognizes the complex incen-
tives generated by disability coverage and alters the benefits contract 
so workers bear some of the costs of the injury themselves. They get no 
lost-wage pay during the waiting period and only partial reimbursement 
thereafter. These cost-sharing arrangements exist to induce workers to 
take an appropriate amount of care on the work site and only the neces-
sary time off work. HRM practices can affect those incentives.
An Illustrative Model of Three Cases of Worker Reimbursement
Consider a small construction company (Table 1.1A,B,C). Initially 
assume the firm’s policy is to allow sick-day pay to reimburse work-
ers for lost wages during the waiting period. We will call this the usual 
case. We also assume a simple fixed input-output process (a Leontief 
technology) that requires five laborers to construct a building.3 Only 
construction workers actually build; the foremen supervise workers and 
help replace the labor services of injured construction workers. We as-
sume the rate of building depends only on the number of construction 
laborers, but the rate of concomitant accidents varies with the degree of 
care exercised by the workers and the supervising foremen. 
Since output is fixed, the firm’s economic problem is to minimize 
the sum of labor costs and safety costs. In this example, each foreman 
is paid $100,000 and each construction laborer is paid $40,000. Each 
accident costs $30,000 in terms of replacement labor and capital costs. 
These are the only costs associated with on-the-job accidents. Initial-
ly, suppose a workers’ compensation system is in place that only pays 
some of the lost wages after the waiting period, though the firm’s HRM 
practices allow workers to use their sick-day benefits to replace their 
lost wages for the first three days following an injury. Hence, injured 
workers bear some costs of workplace injuries, though not any costs 
associated with the waiting period. 
Table 1.1A is the usual case, before any changes in standard HRM 
practices are implemented. Our assumed Leontief technology is such 
that with the number of laborers fixed, the output is fixed, and there is 
no substitution between foremen and laborers in building production. 
While adding more foremen doesn’t increase the number of buildings, 
Butler&Park.indb   7 6/22/2005   11:51:34 AM
8   Butler and Park
it does lower the number of accidents. Foremen monitor the safety con-
tent of work, and with more foremen present, safety costs fall, although 
at a diminishing rate. Since output is fixed, the firm maximizes its prof-
its by minimizing the costs. 
The tradeoff in Table 1.1A is simple: more foremen reduce accident 
costs but increase wage costs. The firm’s optimal allocation rule will 
be to add foremen until the marginal cost of the additional foremen (in 
terms of the increase in wage costs) is greater than the marginal benefit 
of the additional foremen (in terms of the reduction in safety costs). In 
Table 1.1A, the cost-minimizing level of output is produced by going 
with two foremen. Going from one foreman to two increases the wage 
costs by $100,000 while it reduces the number of accidents from eight 
to four, saving $120,000 in accident costs. However, going from two 
foremen to three increases overall costs: wage costs rise by $100,000 
while accident costs only fall by $90,000.
Even though the firm could construct its buildings without any acci-
dents by hiring five foremen, it does not choose to do so. The additional 
costs (in terms of foremen’s wages) do not justify the additional gains 
from producing with no injuries. It is not optimal to reduce the injuries 
to zero. Indeed, in each of the three cases we examine in Table 1.1, it is 
cheaper to allow some injuries than it is to do away with all injuries.
HRM Practices Can Worsen Incentive or Moral Hazard Problems
Suppose that we change HRM policy, but in a way that provides 
fewer incentives for workers to take care. Specifically, suppose that the 
new HRM policy guarantees that all lost wages due to an injury will 
be reimbursed, not just those of the initial waiting period, without time 












1 5 8 300,000 240,000 540,000
2 5 4 400,000 120,000 520,000a
3 5 1 500,000 30,000 530,000
5 5 0 700,000 0 700,000
a Optimal cost-benefit level.
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limitation or a financial cap to the total benefits received: the company 
makes up any difference between the employees’ wages and workers’ 
compensation benefits through a wage continuation policy that guaran-
tees that 100 percent of the worker’s nominal wage will be replaced. 
With their pay as high on a workers’ compensation claim as it is on 
the job, 1) workers could take more risks on the job than they formerly 
did when they bore some of the wage costs of an accident, changing 
their real safety behavior, or 2) workers might simply report more ac-
cidents than they formerly did, given the same level of risk. The former 
is called risk-bearing moral hazard; the latter, claims-reporting moral 
hazard (Butler and Worrall 1991). As the workers’ insurance coverage 
under the new HRM policy expands, moral hazard potential increases 
and the number of reported claims rises. 
An example of this rise in injury rates, holding the level of monitor-
ing constant, is given in Table 1.1B. While the output remains constant 
at the same level it did in Table 1.1A, the accidents double for each 
combination of laborers and foremen. With one foreman and five labor-
ers, the number of reported accidents goes from eight with normal care 
to 16 when laborers take less care because of moral hazard response. 
As the number of reported injuries doubles, the value of additional fore-
men increases. In Table 1.1A, going from one to two foremen decreases 
accident costs by $120,000; in Table 1.1B, going from one to two fore-
men decreases accident costs by $240,000. Because the marginal cost 
of foremen stays constant, the increased marginal benefit of additional 
foremen increases the firm’s demand for their monitoring activity, and 
the optimal number of foremen rises. In Table 1.1B the potential for 
moral hazard behavior has increased, and the optimal number of fore-
men has risen from two to three. 
Finally, as a direct result of the increase in the moral hazard under 
the new HRM policy reflected in Table 1.1B, there are more claims, so 
safety costs are higher for every combination of input (except for where 
there are five foremen; here the costs remain zero).
HRM Practices Can Also Improve Incentive or Moral Hazard 
Problems 
Suppose that instead of “topping off” disability benefits so there 
were no wages lost when workers were injured, the firm adopted a 
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policy that moved in a different direction: it adopted the HRM prac-
tices of Table 1.1A with respect to disability benefits (only two-thirds 
of the wage is replaced following an injury), but now it has added a 
profit-sharing plan in which it distributes 10 percent of the company’s 
profits to workers. Especially for a small company where workers can 
more readily monitor each other and apply peer pressure (so there is 
less likely to be a free rider response that mitigates the financial incen-
tives), this is likely to align employees’ incentives with management’s 
profit-maximizing efforts.4 We may suppose employees respond to such 
profit-sharing incentives by being more careful on the job or simply by 
filing fewer claims than in Tables 1.1A and 1.1B.
In Table 1.1C, the input combinations are the same as those in Ta-
bles 1.1A and 1.1B, but there are fewer accidents that result at each 
level of input: Table 1.1C input combinations now have only half the 
accident rates of Table 1.1A, and only one-fourth the accident rates of 
Table 1.1B. Total costs are naturally lower for each combination of 
inputs, and marginal benefits of monitoring are lowered as well. Go-
ing from one foreman to two reduces accident costs by only $60,000, 
but it costs $100,000 in additional salary to obtain this reduction: the 
marginal benefits from safety monitoring have fallen, but the marginal 
costs stayed the same. Hence, less monitoring is optimal and only one 
foreman will be hired to work with the five laborers. If we assume that 
company revenue is $520,000, this implies profit sharing of $10,000 
with one foreman (10 percent of profits = [$520,000 − $420,000] × 0.1), 
$6,000 with two foremen, and $500 with three foremen. This minimizes 
total costs at $420,000, given the new worker incentives induced by 
the HRM changes. Indeed, in the absence of profit sharing, the firm 
Table 1.1B  Moral Hazard Response: Full Wage Replacement Benefits 











1 5 16 300,000 480,000 780,000
2 5 8 400,000 240,000 640,000
3 5 2 500,000 60,000 560,000a
5 5 0 700,000 0 700,000
a Optimal cost-benefit level.
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would revert to Table 1.1A outcomes and total costs would increase by 
$90,000 (accounting for the profit-sharing payout).
HRM Practices Can Improve or Worsen Technical Efficacy
While the examples in Table 1.1 focused on workers’ incentives 
(through risk-bearing and claims-reporting moral hazard) as HRM prac-
tices changed, those tables could just as well have represented changes 
in production efficiency (through physical ergonomic changes) induced 
by changes in HRM practices. If a change in HRM practices discour-
aged communications between worker and firm, it could worsen tech-
nical efficiency, and the results could be those pictured in Table 1.1B. 
For example, if HRM practices included safety standards that didn’t im-
prove safety but limited productivity—say, wearing thin, slippery silk 
gloves when handling power equipment in an effort to reduce carpal 
tunnel syndrome—then the change in HRM practices could conceiv-
ably increase accident costs. On the other hand, if the implementation 
of new HRM practices improves communications between the worker 
and the firm in a way that results in fewer accidents for each level of 
output, then costs would tend to change as they did in Table 1.1C. As-
sembling some components on the ground and then hauling them into 
place might be one such improvement. Changes in assembly sequenc-
ing, tool usage, and even product design might be other such improve-
ments.













1 5 4 300,000 120,000 420,000a
2 5 2 400,000 60,000 460,000
3 5 0.5b 500,000 15,000 515,000
5 5 0 700,000 0 700,000
a Optimal cost-benefit level. Assuming total revenue is $520,000, total costs including 
profit sharing are $430,000, $466,000, $515,500, and $700,000, depending on number 
of foremen. 
b Represents one accident every other period.
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The discussion of Table 1.1 illustrates the issues addressed in this 
book: the extent to which changes in HRM practices change accident 
costs, which HRM practices are most effective, and whether those re-
sult in moral hazard changes or changes in technical efficiency. In a 
world of perfect certainty and full information, the firm would always 
adopt those HRM practices that were optimal, producing the best com-
bination of technical efficiency and economic incentives. So any expan-
sion of a practice, or adoption of a new practice, would result in lower 
accident costs, given that output was held constant. But the optimal 
combination might not always be obvious to firms because of informa-
tional asymmetries, contract restrictions, poor management incentives, 
or inept bureaucratic procedures. In this study, we address these issues 
using a sample of Minnesota firms. We chose firms from that state be-
cause we have extensive data on their workers’ compensation costs as 
well as their HRM practices. Using this sample, we hope to estimate 
not only which HRM practices are most cost-effective, but also whether 
they reduce costs through a reduction in moral hazard or an increase in 
technical efficiency.
Notes
 1.  See Walter Oi (1974) for an extensive analysis of this tradeoff.
 2. See Butler, Gardner, and Gardner (1997) for empirical examples and citations to 
the empirical safety literature.
 3. Wassily Leontief, a Nobel laureate in economics, pioneered the use of produc-
tion functions where the ratios of inputs to outputs were fixed so there was no 
substitution between inputs. This type of production has been used extensively 
in short-term business forecasting and production planning.
 4. The free rider problem arises when one worker does not incur the costs of tak-
ing care, thinking that all other workers will take care instead. Thus he is a “free 
rider” in that he doesn’t incur the costs but plans to enjoy the benefits (the extra 
profits) generated when others take care.
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